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Judgment from the CJEU in the Wightman case was delivered on the 
10th of December, in which the Court of Justice ruled that the 
notification by a Member State of its intention to leave the EU was 
unilaterally revocable by the Member State. In doing so, the Court 
emphasised that the Sovereignty of the Member State concerned was 
a key element to this decision, and to decide otherwise would interfere 
with the freedom that Member States enjoy to either apply to join or to 
leave the EU in accordance with the procedures set out in the Treaty 
on the European Union. 
This has therefore provided timely clarification of the position of the 
applicants in this case regarding the options available to the UK 
Parliament in advance of the ‘meaningful vote’ due to take place in 
Parliament. The judgment itself makes a number of important points 
and it is these that I would like to discuss in this blog. It also differs 
slightly from the Opinion delivered by the Advocate General in this 
case last week. 
Admissability 
As was expected, the Court dismissed the arguments for 
inadmissibility of the case on grounds of it being hypothetical or 
advisory only. The Court found that what it was dealing with here was 
a genuine dispute. The Court, in arriving at this conclusion, noted the 
presumption that a case is relevant if it is seen as such by the 
referring court, as it is they who bear the responsibility for the 
subsequent decision in the case (Para. 26). The Court will only refuse 
to answer a reference made by a Member State court in situations 
where the question asked is not relevant to the case at hand. This 
was clearly not the situation here, as the issue of revocability of Article 
50 TEU was at the heart of the case brought by the Applicants in this 
case (Para. 27). 
The Court also pointed out that the fact that the UK Government held 
no position regarding the revocability of Article 50 TEU was irrelevant 
to the existence of a dispute, seemingly acknowledging that it was a 
choice of the UK Government not to take a position on this (Para. 32). 
In this regard they referred to the earlier case of Afton Chemical, 
C-343/09. 
The important point here, as far as the Court was concerned, as the 
existence of a provision of primary EU Law that was in need of 
clarification, and on this basis, it was important for the Court to rule on 
this matter. They therefore dismissed the UK Government’s claim of 
inadmissibility. This therefore allowed them to go on to consider the 
substance of Article 50 itself, which (unlike the AG) it would not have 
been able to do, if it had considered the case inadmissible. 
Interpretation of Article 50 TEU 
In interpreting the meaning of Article 50, the Court took an approach 
that treated the issue of interpretation as a matter which should be 
considered in the light of the Treaties as a whole, (Para. 46) and not 
just Article 50 in isolation. This approach was necessary because the 
interpretation here was as to matters that Article 50 TEU was silent 
about, and therefore the amount of inference from wording within 
Article 50 TEU itself was somewhat limited. It also pointed out that in 
taking this ‘whole’ approach, it did so because it was not just the 
objectives and wording of Article 50 that was important, but its 
purpose and context within the Treaties as a whole. It concluded that 
Article 50 had two purposes: “namely, first, enshrining the sovereign 
right of a Member State to withdraw from the European Union and, 
secondly, establishing a procedure to enable such a withdrawal to 
take place in an orderly fashion.” (Para. 56) 
However, where the Court was able to deduce meaning from 
particular wording in Article 50(2), in line with the Paragraphs 99 to 
102 of the AG Opinion, it also confirmed that the notification in Article 
50(2) was only as to “intention”, and therefore did not serve to bind 
the UK irrevocably into exiting from the EU if it subsequently changed 
its position and wished to remain. This would logically be in line with 
the Court’s consideration that Article 50 reflect the sovereignty that 
the UK had in its control of the activation and revocation of the 
process. 
Revocability of Article 50 TEU 
The above point was emphasised in the discussion of the revocability 
of Article 50 TEU. In discussing this issue, the Court made liberal use 
of the word “sovereignty”, which featured prominently in the judgment 
itself. This was cited as the basis upon which a departing Member 
State could revoke its Article 50 notification. The Court cited the 
objectives and shared values of the EU in the preamble to both the 
TEU and the TFEU, and the fact that a state that wished to join the 
EU under Article 49 TEU was voluntarily doing so. That sovereign 
right to decide to apply to join the EU was therefore also mirrored in 
the sovereign right of a Member State to leave if it so wished. 
This mirroring of joining and leaving is an important element of the 
sovereignty argument discussed in the judgment. The Court 
commented that a Member State could not be forced to accede to the 
EU, and therefore correspondingly they could not be forced to leave 
either. This was an important part of the discussions around the 
predecessor to Article 50 in the Constitutional Treaty, in particular 
regarding the ability to expel a Member State if it abused the 
withdrawal process. It was felt at the time “that the voluntary and 
unilateral nature of the withdrawal decision should be ensured.” (Para. 
68) 
This picked up on a point raised in the AG Opinion, whereby the 
interests of every Member State are protected in that it was not 
possible to force a Member State out of the EU against its will. 
Accepting this principle, and the fact that the Article 50 notification 
merely expressed an intention; to prevent a Member State from 
changing its policy and attempting to withdraw its notification during 
the 2-year process under Article 50(2) would amount to forcing a 
Member State to leave the EU with its only option to re-apply under 
Article 49 TEU. 
The Consequences of Revocation 
There has been a certain amount of speculation regarding the 
consequences for the UK as a result of revocation of Article 50 TEU. It 
has been suggested that the position of the UK and its circumstances 
within the EU would be fundamentally changed. The UK currently has 
an opt-out from the Euro, an opt-out from the Schengen Agreement, 
and a rebate on its budget contributions. It has been suggested that 
one or all of these things would be under threat in the event of the UK 
triggering the Article 50 process and then choosing to remain a 
Member State. 
The Court was unequivocal about this however, and stated: 
“The revocation by a Member State of the notification of its intention to 
withdraw, before the occurrence of one of the events referred to in 
paragraph 57 of the present judgment, reflects a sovereign decision 
by that State to retain its status as a Member State of the European 
Union, a status which is not suspended or altered by that 
notification.” (emphasis added). 
The judgment from RO, C-327/18 PPU was cited in support of this 
argument – EU law is as applicable after notification and right up to 
the point of exit of the UK as it was before, and therefore “revocation 
is to confirm the EU membership of the Member State concerned 
under terms that are unchanged as regards its status as a Member 
State” (Para.74). 
Potential for Abuse of Revocability 
A key element of the AG Opinion in this case was addressing the 
Commission and Council’s concerns regarding abuse of the Article 50 
TEU process by a Member State using unilateral revocability as a tool 
to manipulate the process. The AG made much of the concept of 
‘good faith’ as a guard against such abuse by a departing Member 
State, and argued that this was therefore a condition of the ability to 
revoke. This in itself challenges the unilateral nature of the 
revocability, and the Court’s judgment has not discussed this concept 
in their ruling. They did however make the following comments in 
addressing the issue of abuse: 
• Anything that prevented the unilateral nature of a decision to 
revoke by a departing Member State was rejected in the drafting 
of the predecessor to Article 50 in the Constitutional Treaty. The 
voluntary nature of entering and exiting the EU, and the 
expression of sovereignty that this produces, were considered 
more important. 
• The arguments of the Council and Commission were directly 
refuted by the Court in stating that to require approval for a 
revocation would essentially transform a sovereign right into a 
conditional one, and therefore this would be incompatible with 
the point above about states taking voluntary acts. 
• This therefore meant that as long as the 2 year time limit (or any 
extended time as approved by the Council) had not expired, and 
as long as there was not a fully ratified withdrawal agreement in 
place, then the departing Member State retained the right to 
revoke unilaterally. 
• The Court agreed that in order for this revocation to have effect, 
it must take place in accordance with the State’s own 
constitutional requirements, and this again aligns with the 
Opinion of the AG. However, instead of any mention of good 
faith, the Court instead insisted that revocation must be 
“unequivocal and unconditional, that is to say that the purpose of 
that revocation is to confirm the EU membership of the Member 
State concerned … and that revocation brings the withdrawal 
procedure to an end.” (Para.74) This would therefore act as a 
safeguard against the specific possibility of a Member State 
attempting some form of Article 50 “hokey cokey” in order to 
manipulate the procedure. 
The net result of this decision is that we now know that Article 50 TEU 
notification is definitely unilaterally revocable. However, the approach 
of the Court of Justice went further than the Opinion of the AG. The 
Court pushed the emphasis far more in the direction of the notion of 
sovereignty, something which has been downplayed by the UK 
Government since the referendum in 2016. The UK has sovereignty 
as an EU Member State, and retains that sovereignty because every 
aspect of being in the EU, as well as joining and leaving, is based 
upon the concept of Member States voluntary participation in the 
organisation, which they are free to withdraw through the Article 50 
process. 
